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Abstract 
 
This article examines a number of critical-theoretical, utopian alternatives to the dominant temporal 
conception of 'homogeneous empty time'. It explores the ways in which difference is theorised 
within the field of time, and the ways in which relations to the past and future can be constructed 
non-sequentially. It focuses on four related theories. Nietzsche's theory of eternal return is shown to 
be inspired by a critique of backward-looking views of time and an orientation to an abundance of 
the present. Benjamin's theory of messianic time combines the immediacy of 'now-time' with a non-
successive connection to past and future times. Deleuze's Bergsonian view of time suggests the 
simultaneity of the past with the present, and the possibility of constructing connections between 
different zones of time and actualising these zones in the present. Agamben's theory of temporal 
play focuses on immediacy, the redemption of the past, and the abandonment of the mastery of 
history. Each of these theories is discussed in terms of its own conception of time, its difference 
from dominant conceptions of time, and its relationship to utopia. While offering four distinct 
alternatives, the theorists all critique alienated and objectivist views of time, and offer different 
varieties of temporal rhizomatics and polyphony. The juxtaposition of these theories provides the 
underpinnings for temporal utopianism as a new field of study. The idea of temporal utopianism 
demonstrates that utopia can be a temporal as well as a spatial phenomenon, and that the experience 
of time characteristic of capitalist modernity is contingent rather than necessary. It thus points 
towards a rupture with the sense of closure generated by dominant conceptions of time, creating 
temporal zones in which utopian spaces can be actualised. 
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Introduction 
 
The ordinary experience of time under capitalism has frequently been subject to 
criticism, yet the multiple alternative possibilities have rarely been explored within a 
coherent framework of analysis. The basic thesis of this paper is that the mainstream 
approach to time is not the only way of conceiving or experiencing time, and that the 
function of utopia can be applied to time whilst temporal theory can have a utopian 
function. Early utopias were situated in the present though dislocated in space (More, 
2004 [1516]), yet increasingly time has come to have an important role to play in 
thinking about utopias, which are usually conceived to exist in the future and sometimes 
in the past, in formulations such as the Golden Age, Eden and Arcadia (Kumar, 1991: 
18; Goodwin and Taylor, 2009 [1982]: 12). Contemporary utopian theory tends to view 
utopia as something that can be materialized in the present, and often has a critical and 
prefigurative function (Petersen, 2010: 17). Whilst the utopian function has frequently 
been applied to a wide range of social practices including architecture (Tafuri, 1976; 
Borsi, 1997; Coleman 2005), art (Bloch, 1986 [1959]), literature (Bloch, 1986 [1859]; 
Moylan, 1986; Sargisson, 2006), intentional communities (Kanter, 1972; Veysey, 1978; 
Pepper, 1991; Sargisson, 2000) and social theory (Levitas, 1990; Goodwin and Taylor, 
2009 [1982]) it has not often been applied to time itself.  
 
This paper is an exercise in critical utopianism, looking in particular at the construction 
of alterity in relation to experiences of time and temporality. According to this approach, 
utopianism should be established at the level of the critical function of a practice in 
mobilising hope or desire (Levitas, 1990: 189). Considering utopia in terms of function 
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is particularly useful, since it allows one to examine the effects that utopias have upon 
the world whilst not limiting the form and content of articulations of desire. The 
assumption is that possibility should not be limited to the present frame. McManus 
argues that: ‘The utopian challenge to knowledge is precisely the imperative to "think 
differently": to feel and know the world in ways that "venture beyond" the given, that 
are not captured and contained by the exigencies of the present order of things’ 
(McManus, 2007). Thus rather than seeing utopia as dislocated in time, one might 
conceive that it fundamentally alters the relationship between past, present and future. 
This utopian approach is similar to yet differs from that taken by Barbara Adam (1990, 
2004), who seeks commonalities between different views of time. Adam seeks to 
identify aspects such as synchronisation, pursuit of immortality, finitude and time-
regulation which are taken to be universal to all views of time in spite of differences in 
how these things are done (Adam, 2004: 123). This underlying universalism is 
counterposed to our argument for open-ended transgressions implied in utopian views 
of time, which often reject one or more of these supposed universals.  
 
Contemporary theorists elaborate that utopia is not necessarily deferred or prefigurative 
but rather experimental, experiential and subjective. A distinction can therefore be 
drawn between fixed utopias, or utopias of form, and those utopias which are propulsive 
and immanent, and reject the idea of rupture between present and future (Bonanno, 
1988; Anon, 1999; Anon, 2001; Robinson and Tormey, 2009). It is the latter case which 
expresses utopianism as a transformative and desire-affirmative phenomenon. As such, 
our approach does not conceive that there should be a single and correct counter-
temporality, rather alternative ways of experiencing time that affirm difference are 
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multiple and possibly even contradictory. There is a need to retrospectively reconstruct a 
literature on alternative ways of conceiving time; a task that we attempt to begin in this 
essay by selecting a small sample of critical theorists who do not limit their theory of 
time to present experience but rather seek to alter the relationship between past, present 
and future in non-foundational ways. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the 
field of temporal utopianism is not limited to these thinkers nor to social theory more 
generally, and our conclusion will signal to further possibilities. First, though, it is 
important to outline what we take to be the mainstream or conventional approach to 
time in order to later compare those theorists we take to transcend its limitations.  
 
Mainstream conceptions of time 
 
The mainstream or dominant conception of time, typified by Benjamin as 'homogeneous 
empty time' and sometimes referred to as 'linear' or 'clock' time, is an antagonist of the 
theorists discussed herein. This standard view takes time to be 'a line, infinitely divisible 
and infinitely extended' (May, 2005: 41), striated in a time-grid and viewed as invariable 
at any moment (Adam, 1990: 106-7). It views time as a succession of psychological 
states or instants of consciousness, existing in a linear and irreversible progression (al-
Saji, 2004: 204). These moments are commodified, controlled, colonised and 
compressed in a process rendered invisible by its pervasiveness (Adam, 2004: 124-5). It 
is embodied in phenomenological views of time, and stems from the identification of 
reality with presence (al-Saji, 2004: 204). In the dominant conception, the present is the 
central moment of time, and defines pasts and futures (as former or later presents). 
Mainstream time is an eternal present, defined permanently by an instrumental or 
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'sensory-motor' schema from a particular point of view. It is distinct from lived 
durations. Bloch argues that clock time proceeds in equal periods by numerical 
progression, and as a result, is indifferent to its contents. It is abstracted from lived time 
(Bloch, 1970: 125) and clashes sharply with ecological and cultural temporalities 
(Adam, 1998: 9).  
 
Homogeneous empty time is associated with the rise of capitalism. The 'use of time as 
resource and commodity [is] a recent phenomenon of western, industrialised nations' 
(Adam, 1990: 102). It is theorised as empty in contrast to filled or fulfilled time (Leslie, 
2000: 198). This type of time is homogeneous because it is composed of identical, 
equivalent and interchangeable units, expressible in representations such as clocks and 
calendars. It is empty because it is not given meaning in special moments; time simply 
passes, and is neutral to the meaningful content with which people fill it. For Benjamin, 
it suggests humanity is condemned to a cycle of reproducing survival in a closed system 
of fate and guilt (Wolin, 1994 [1982]: 51). In many respects, this is a conservative view 
of time, because sameness tends to return: new temporal moments reproduce older ones 
through their structural isomorphism. It operates as a kind of 'transcendental 
conformism' (Hamacher, 2005: 47). Benjamin argues that homogeneous empty time is 
rooted in capitalism, and closely connected to the exchangeability and equivalence of 
commodities and the repetitive cycles of consumerist fashion through which the system 
varies its contents but remains formally the same. It is linked to boredom, the dominant 
affect of the capitalist era (Benjamin, 1999 [1930-5]: 104) and the repetition of the 
'always-the-same' (Wolin, 1994 [1982]: 48). We are bored, argues Benjamin, because 
we don't know what we're waiting for (Benjamin, 1994 [1930-5]): 105).  
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Negri similarly views mainstream time as constructed from labour-time, as quantifiable 
into durations and divisible into units such as hours and days. Such a construction of 
time is the nexus of equivalence. 'Time does not only measure labour, but reduces it to 
homogeneous substance' (Negri, 2005: 23). It is imagined, in fact, as atemporal. 
Capitalist utopia imagines circulation without time or process (Negri, 2005: 50, 53, 57). 
In subsumption, synchronic and diachronic moments are unified (Negri, 2005: 80). 
Such time 'seems to lack all distinction', and reduces complexity to articulation (Negri, 
2005: 49). Capitalist time rests on an appearance of the equivalence of temporal 
moments. For Negri, however, '[t]he form of equivalence is simply an effect of coercion' 
(Negri, 2005: 28). Linear time becomes circular (Negri, 2005: 52). The representation of 
multiple times (or becomings) in a single frame rests in practice on their disciplining or 
reduction to sameness (Negri, 2005: 67). The uniformity of the flow of time depends on 
the ability to destroy exceptions (Negri, 2005: 68). Hence, time is posed for capital as 
command (Negri, 2005: 107). Since it is grounded in a Schmittian decision, capitalist 
time ultimately becomes the zero-time of destruction and disintegration (Negri, 2005: 
46), the annihilation of living temporal being (Negri, 2005: 123). 
 
Marxists have criticised dominant experiences of time as shaped by the work-process 
and its segmentation and alienation of life, a disciplining of time established early in 
capitalist history (Thompson, 1967). According to Deleuze, capitalism is the only 
history which can record history on a commensurable time-line (Lampert, 2006: 123). 
In its latest incarnation, as precarious time, the dominant conception subordinates time 
to availability and communicability. According to precarity activist Alex Foti, precarity 
  
6 
is 'being unable to plan one's time' because of being on call, on a timeframe 'determined 
by external forces' (cited in Neilson and Rossiter, n.d.). Negri sees it as becoming 
groundless in the process, asking, [w]hen the entire time of life has become the time of 
production, who measures whom?' (Negri, 2005: 29). Homogeneous empty time is 
haunted by aporias around, for instance, its dependence on an external referent it cannot 
provide, eliminating the possibility of measurement (Negri, 2005: 24, 42). Barbara 
Adam similarly observes that mainstream time is 'oriented to the collective beat of 
machine time' (Adam, 1990: 106): it effectively subordinates people to clocks and 
machines. 'Clock time is based on the principle of repetition without change. Distinct 
from the variable rhythm and contextual differences of living systems, it recasts time in 
an atemporal form' (Adam, 1998: 14).  
 
In what follows we will outline a series of critical theorists whom we take to put 
forward desire-affirmative and immanentist approaches to temporality. For each 
theorist, we will outline the theory of time put forward, we will compare the theory to 
the mainstream in order to highlight the ways in which each author moves beyond the 
limits and alienating aspects of dominant theory, and we will also re-conceptualise each 
theory as ‘utopian’. 
 
A point should be made about our selection of authors. The specifically capitalist form 
of time has not persisted throughout history. It differs, for instance, from cyclical and 
seasonal views of time related to the cycles of nature, and mythical conceptions of time 
in which the time of infinity constantly impinges on historical time. One can also 
contrast temporal experiences of marginality, which are characterised by temporalities 
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of discontinuity and rupture (Henry, 1972). Time is also imagined differently in science-
fiction works such as Doctor Who (Bell, 2009). In this vast field, we have chosen to 
focus on critical theories of time, but the significance of cultural and everyday 
alternatives must also be borne in mind. In addition, there are certain critical theories of 
time that we have not included here due to their endorsement of something akin to the 
dominant conception. For Kant, linear succession is a necessary characteristic time must 
have for knowledge to be possible (Moulard, 2002: 328). Time is also important for 
authors such as Husserl, Heidegger and Derrida, but for reasons which are arguably 
tragic, rather than utopian: time brings irreversibility, finitude, deferral (which is not to 
say that these authors neglect utopia entirely). Homogeneous empty time also underpins 
orthodox Marxist views of progress. Benjamin further adds that '[t]he concept of 
humankind's historical progress cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression 
through a homogeneous, empty time' (Benjamin 1940: Thesis XIII). Hence, while they 
are important critical theories of time, these approaches fall outside utopian temporality.  
We have also not attempted to engage with Marxists who move beyond teleological 
conceptions of history, such as Bloch and Negri. While such authors clearly fall within 
utopian temporality, their relationship to the broader history of Marxism's complicities 
with homogeneous empty time places them beyond the scope of this article. 
 
Nietzsche’s conception of time as eternal return 
 
The conception 
Nietzsche’s theory of time finds articulation in his concept of ‘the eternal return’. We 
feel that the utopian framework put forward in this article aids a particular 
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understanding of the concept. A simple interpretation is that the cosmos literally repeats, 
and each person's life is lived identically, an infinite number of times: ‘all the 
unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to thee again, and all in the same 
series and sequence .... The eternal sand-glass of existence will ever be turned once 
more, and thou with it, thou speck of dust!’ (Nietzsche, 2006 [1882]: 152). Some 
thinkers have argued that even though this is unlikely to be a cosmological 
phenomenon, the argument would be deprived of its existential and affective force were 
it not read literally (Hatab, 2005: 91; Heidegger, 1991 [1961]), indeed Nietzsche 
appears to encourage such a reading in the above quote. However, Zarathustra later 
affirms the role of chance in this philosophy: ‘there is no eternal reason-spider and 
reason-cobweb – That thou art to me a dancing-floor for divine chances, that thou art to 
me a table of the Gods, for divine dice and dice-players’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1883]: 163). 
These readings are incompatible, since the latter would suggest an ethical doctrine 
relying on a concept of free will whilst the former would suggest predetermination. 
 
Following Deleuze, we favour interpretations of eternal recurrence as the eternal return 
of active forces, and the affirmation of becoming. Such an understanding overcomes 
accusations of fatalism in Nietzsche’s doctrine: ‘Returning is everything but everything 
is affirmed in a single moment’ (Deleuze, 2006 [1986]: 67). This interpretation 
overcomes contradictions between hypothetical and cosmological interpretations: 
‘Eternal return as a physical doctrine, affirms the being of becoming. But as a selective 
ontology, it affirms this being of becoming as the ‘self-affirming’ of becoming-active’ 
(Deleuze, 2006: 67). This echoes Nietzsche’s assertion that the eternal return should not 
be taken ‘too lightly’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 154). Whilst the dwarf puts forward a 
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similar theory of cyclical time (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 152-3) his is unrefined since it 
takes a disinterested and transcendental (God-like) view of the passage of time: ‘thou 
knowest not mine abysmal thought! It – couldst thou not endure’ (Nietzsche, 1997 
[1893]: 154). Zarathustra’s perspective takes itself and the present moment to be the 
focal point of all past and future where the two eternities meet and are actualised 
(Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 154). 
  
Difference and critique 
The eternal return explicitly challenges the Christian view of time, which has a 
backward-looking relationship to temporality (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 138). Moral 
notions of sin and redemption, or justice and punishment, rely on atoning for what has 
already been done and promote a ‘spirit of revenge’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 138) 
which is psychologically damaging because one cannot change the past – ‘time doth not 
run backward’ (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 138). Nietzsche also refutes progressivism and 
the linear and cumulative nature of homogeneous empty time - each moment is a new 
throw of the dice (Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 212). Eternal recurrence is an immanent 
philosophy – recurrence occurs entirely in this world - there is no better world (heaven) 
or worse world (hell), and eternity does not negate the moment but affirms it: “if 
becoming could resolve itself into being or into nothingness ... then this state must have 
been reached’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 549).  
  
Nietzsche’s utopianism 
The eternal return simultaneously criticises backward-looking ontology (we would not 
will the return of bad conscience) and offers an alternative in the form of the present-
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affirming and forward-looking ‘creating Will’ which says ‘But thus I would have it’ 
(Nietzsche, 1997 [1893]: 139). Affirming the Moment also means affirming the past: 
‘Said ye ever Yea to one joy? O my friends, then said ye Yea also unto all woe. All 
things are enlinked, enlaced and enamoured’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 312). This signals to the 
utopian corollary to eternal return; the ‘will to power’, which is indeed life itself 
(Nietzsche, 1968: 550) and gives one the ability to affirm life and endure the eternal 
recurrence. Those who prove strongest are those who ‘not only concede but love a fair 
amount accidents and nonsense; those who can think of man with a considerable 
reduction of his value without becoming small and weak on that account’ (Nietzsche, 
1968: 38). One might ask, however, whether this means a slave cannot attain this state, 
and whether the underprivileged are destined to remain so? 
 
Our interpretation of Nietzsche’s utopia is one of abundance. Zarathustra is frequently 
cited as ‘abundant’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 331; Nietzsche, 1997 [1883]: 103-4) and his 
abundance resides not in riches or in power as normally conceived, but in his wisdom, 
creativity and ability to affirm all of life and also to teach affirmation; that is, he also 
achieves abundance through his social (and environmental) bonds. Thus, reading 
Nietzsche as an individualist misinterprets his concept of becoming, which insists on 
self-redefinition, the absorption of the opponent, and the processual nature of identity 
(Nietzsche, 1968: 331), affirming the whole of life to the exclusion of blueprints and 
progressivism. Thus while the concept of the ‘Superman’ has been misread and 
misappropriated in various ways as a totalising/hegemonic utopia, including the 
association of his work with volkisch ideology (for example by Young, 2006), it is 
important to note that Nietzsche himself did not defer his utopia to the future nor did he 
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view the Superman as a fixed and static goal: ‘Can we remove the idea of a goal from 
the process and then affirm the process in spite of this? – This would be the case if 
something were attained at every moment within this process – and always the same’ 
(Nietzsche, 1968: 36).  
 
Benjamin’s conception of messianic time 
 
The conception 
Time is central to Benjamin's view of the difference between the historical and 
messianic moments. Benjamin pioneered the critique of homogeneous empty time 
previously described, arguing that it is a social construct arising from capitalist 
constructions of experience. His account of messianic time is specifically counterposed 
to the homogeneous empty time of capitalist experience. Messianic time, or “now-time” 
(jetzt-zeit), interrupts homogeneous empty time because of its immediacy, and the 
connections it creates between points disconnected in homogeneous empty time (for 
instance, between past and present revolutions). Now-times are 'unique visions of 
transcendence that grace the continuum of history' (Wolin, 1994 [1982]: 48) and form 
monadic sites in which reconciled life is compressed (Wolin, 1994 [1982]: 58). Now-
time brings dialectics to a 'standstill' in a 'messianic cessation of happening', interrupting 
the smooth progression of history (Benjamin, 1970 [1955]: 263).  
 
Messianic time, not homogeneous empty time, is the site of historical agency. ‘History 
is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous empty time, but time filled 
with the presence of the now’ (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis XIV). In German, the 'now' as 
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immediate (jetzt) is distinct from the present as something lived as already actualised 
and thus in a sense past (erlebnis). 'Now' is thus something more than simply presence, 
connoting a rupture between an immediate moment and the temporal sequence. 
Messianic time is experienced as fully immediate, not as a flow; it is lived intensely, 
rather than through the anaesthetising effects of linear time; it is connected to eternity; it 
is ruptural; and it is associated with the affect of rausch or intoxification. Its condition 
of 'specific recognizability' (Benjamin, 1999 [1930-5]: 463) contrasts with emptiness 
and homogeneity. Optimism arises, not from what history brings, but from what arises 
in its ruin (Wolin, 1994: 60).  
 
Difference and critique 
Benjamin's theory of history reverses the usual narrative of progress, suggesting that 
Hell is not a feared future but is the continuation of the present (Benjamin, 1985). The 
perspective of the angel of history views not a chain of events but an accumulation of 
wreckage and a storm propelling into the future while fixated on the past (Benjamin, 
1940: Thesis IX). History is thus akin to a speeding train with broken brakes, and 
revolution pulls the escape cord. Instead of revolution being the continuation of 
progress which disaster interrupts, it is an interruption of the ongoing disaster, not going 
with the flow but going against it from a radically exterior standpoint. Hence, the 
Messiah, or the classless society, is not the end of a process but its interruption 
(Benjamin, 2006: 402).  
 
The irruption of messianic time is an emergence of novelty in history. It replaces the 
new as return of the same in capitalism with a sense of radical newness. It blasts an era 
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out of homogeneous empty time, turning it into a monad (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis 
XVII). It requires a different kind of memory, which 'redeem[s]' the past and recalls past 
generations and lost paradise, not by portraying it as it really was, but by seizing hold of 
memories connected to intense moments’ (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis VI). Montage, the 
connection of dissimilar elements, is central to messianic time (Taussig, 1984: 89). Past 
moments thereby become active and present in contemporary events, as an emotional 
force. Messianic time has been analysed as overcoming the binary between linear and 
cyclical time (Gibbs, 2005: 198), instead connecting time between points (Gibbs, 2005: 
214). Possibilities missed in the past remain possibilities for the future, and call on the 
present for actualisation (Hamacher, 2005: 40-1). This stance of transformation by 
radical rupture rather than linear transition or progression (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis XVI) 
is uniquely the stance of the excluded, or revolutionary classes (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis 
XV). It is through such ruptures that the continuity of future times with the past 
victories of oppressors can be broken.  
 
Benjamin’s utopian moments 
Benjamin's messianism is part of utopian theory as an expression of future-oriented 
energies of hope and desire. It draws explicitly on 'the critical power of utopian images' 
(Jacobs, 1999: 97). The goal of his theory of messianic time is to make something leap 
out from its context, so the thing and its context escape one another (Nägele, 1988: 22). 
In Benjamin's vocabulary, this is known as redemption (or revolution), the moment 
when messianic time enters and overcomes homogeneous empty time. Whether it is 
socially transformative is debated in the literature, with some authors viewing Benjamin 
as deeply pessimistic and nihilistic (Corngold and Jennings, 1984: 359-60; Wolin, 1994 
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[1982]: 57) or as expressing an underlying structure of history as necessarily contingent, 
split and in crisis (Hamacher, 2005). We here side with Leslie in reading Benjamin's 
theory as more than supplementary. One redeems knowledge of the past in order to act 
in the present (Leslie, 2005: 200). Benjamin's is an 'idea of redemption and revolution 
as instants of a mystical messianic now which interrupt linear historical time and form 
“constellations” with images of the past' (Handelman, 1991: 148), but in which the 
future utopia cannot be grasped concretely (Handelman, 1991: 159), so great is its 
distance from the present. History is rewritten to produce 'purgative and redemptive 
political action' (Jennings, 1987: 51), with the historian 'redeeming the past to unstick 
the present from its seemingly necessary future' (Gibbs, 2005: 214). The memory of the 
past, the stance of avenger and redeemer, is therefore necessary to provide a 
revolutionary spirit to movements (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis XII).  
 
Redemption is not solely a subjective experience, but also transforms everyday life as 
hope in the past (Szondi, 1978). Redemption is conceived as temporal 
transubstantiation, in which messianic time reconfigures a space constructed in 
homogeneous empty time. It is not completely outside the space it reconfigures, but 
rather, is a line of flight within it. It reveals a reverse side which is otherwise invisible, a 
subterranean history coexisting with the surface history (Handelman, 1991: 162-3). It 
requires a confrontation with the path-dependencies built into the dominant social logic; 
escaping this dynamic restores the ability to reconstruct. The standpoint of battling 
against the flow of history creates urgency and an emphasis on agency which are 
lacking in progressivist conceptions. For Benjamin, revolution redeems the past as well 
as the present, and in contrast, even the dead are not safe from the enemy (Benjamin, 
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1970 [1955]: 255), since pasts survive only as recognisable to a present which redeems 
them (Benjamin, 1940: Thesis V). Only in a fulfilled humanity is the entire past legible 
(Benjamin, 1940: Thesis III). Transformative agency thus stems from intensities 
connected to messianic time. There is a similarity between Benjamin's conception and 
the immanent, immediate intensity connected with the formation of activist 
subjectivities in moments of action and emotive ritual (Peterson, 2001; Juris, 2008; 
Sullivan, 2006). He is sometimes said to have uncovered 'the temporal structure of 
political affect' (Hamacher, 2005: 38). Such affect emerges in a temporal breach which 
creates a rhizome with other moments in time, bursting open the closure of the present.  
 
Deleuze’s theory of time 
 
The conception 
In Deleuze's theory, time refers to the entire field of inner experience and its connection 
to underlying ontologies. Whereas space is the form of outer sense, time is a kind of 
inner sense. Deleuze describes time as 'auto-affection' (Deleuze, 1992 [1988]): 114-5), 
the production of affects within the self. The concept of temporal regimes in Deleuze 
and Guattari thus carries the implications of different spirits, rhythms, or logics of 
different forms of life. Each entity has its own rhythm of duration, revealed in the 
process of its transformation, such as sugar dissolving (Deleuze, 1990 [1966]: 32). 
 
According to Deleuze, the past needs to be theorised radically differently from the usual 
view of it as a former present. The past is divided into different zones. It contains 'an 
infinite number of temporal structures' (Lampert, 2006: 44). The 'pure' past is the virtual 
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coexistence of all time (Lampert, 2006: 12). The pure past coexists with the present 
(Deleuze, 2004 [1968]: 108-15). The past becomes visible to thought by means of the 
virtual image, which is expressed for instance in the formation of concepts. In the 
virtual image, the past is not defined relative to a new present, but relative to an actual 
present of which it is the virtual aspect (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 77). Memory and history 
are affected by different views of time. Deleuze seeks a type of history which gets 
between points in time 'by way of an anti-memory that deterritorializes what happened 
in between' (Lampert, 2006: 10). It constructs a type of memory which is non-
representational (al-Saji, 2004: 203).  
 
The present is primarily sensory-motor, and spatial, exercising a choice of particular 
memories from the past, within its own duration (al-Saji, 2004: 214). A 'present' refers 
here to a particular perspective, conditioned by 'attention to life' from a particular zone 
of sensory experience or practical concern (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 98). These different 
presents move at different speeds but are 'bound into the same universe', sometimes 
becoming antagonistic (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 99). The present is also internally split, 
because of the relations into which it enters with the past and future (Lampert, 2006: 34; 
al-Saji, 2004: 209; Deleuze, 1990 [1966]: 118). The future is the dimension which 
brings specific desires into the field of the past, searching and selecting among its 
zones. 'The past, to be past... must be searchable, explorable, problematizable, 
penetrable, and livable' (Lampert, 2006: 51). The future is conceived as a search engine 
enabling one to navigate the co-existing zones of the past (Lampert, 2006: 51).  
 
Difference and critique 
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For Deleuze, the construction of time autonomously from space is a major difference 
between his own Bergsonian view of time and the mainstream view. For Deleuze, linear 
time is a surface effect of temporal multiplicities which produces an illusion of identity 
(Widder, 2006: 412). The standard view is criticised for confusing degree with kind, 
positing an addition of successive elements instead of qualitative 'jumps' and 'changes of 
level' among affects, and the reworking of systems of thought (Deleuze, 1990 [1966]: 
23, 61-2). 'It is thus necessary to substitute for the old notion of time, the notion of 
multiple duration' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984 [1972]: 279).  
 
An aspect of Deleuzian time that differs from the mainstream is the replacement of 
succession with synchronicity: different times exist at once. The past and present are not 
successive but coexistent (Deleuze, 1990 [1966]: 59). Each present is connected by a 
vertical line to its own past, and also to the pasts of other presents, which form together 
a single coexistence and contemporaneity (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 89). Historical figures 
or zones are subjective states through which a subject can pass (Lampert, 2006: 2; 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1984 [1972]: 28). Since different zones of time can exist 
simultaneously, time is recomposed as a rhizome rather than a straight line. In Deleuze's 
view of time, 'the threads that weave time are no longer mere horizontal lines of 
succession. Rather, they involve vertical transmissions within a duration that passes 
only because it also coexists with itself in the depths of Bergson's cone of memory' (al-
Saji, 2004: 205). Time is a web which forks, embracing every possibility (Deleuze, 
1989 [1985]: 47). It can be folded and unfolded in ways which create different 
combinations, each an 'age' in its own right, with a coexistence of sheets or continuums 
of different ages (Deleuze, 1989 [1985]: 115).  
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Deleuze views mainstream conceptions as part of an instrumental, 'sensorimotor' 
fixation to which his image of time provides an expressive, dialogical alternative (al-
Saji, 2004: 225-6). Similarly, when comparing events, each is defined by the 
transversals, or passages between different worlds (or multiplicities), needed to pass 
from one to the other (al-Saji, 2004: 93). Time is thus a network, but one in which 
degrees, kinds and trajectories of affinity create distances. 
 
Deleuze’s utopianism 
Deleuze's conception of time is utopian insofar as it opens possibilities for thinking 
about transformation. Utopia for Deleuze is temporal because it involves an untimely 
mode of thinking, out of sorts with its social context. It is 'an experimental struggle with 
the past, taking place in the context of the present... for the sake of the future', creating 
new concepts, peoples and earths (Parr, 2008: 48). The new people and new earth for 
which Deleuze writes (rather than seeking to represent existing people) is a figure of the 
future. Deleuze's temporal theory leads to an unusual view of social change. For 
Deleuze, a revolution is not something new, but rather, is tucked between the temporal 
levels of history (Lampert, 2006: 171). It necessarily pairs past and future as 
simultaneous temporal displacements (Lampert, 2006: 139). Revolutionary occasions 
occur through a moment of time, Kairos, in which singular points are condensed in a 
particular moment (Deleuze, 2004 [1968]: 190). Ways of relating to the past can also be 
divided into dominant and utopian approaches. Imitating the past, copying its models, 
does not relate authentically to the past as a virtual field. A schizorevolutionary, in 
contrast, repeats the past as virtuality (Lampert, 2006: 93-4).  
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Agamben: time and play 
 
The conception 
Whilst Agamben is best renowned for his critical works (1998, 2005) his works also 
contain an often ignored affirmative vision (Prozorov, 2009: 525; Negri, 2003) found 
principally in his messianic theory of time (Agamben, 2007 [1978], 1999, 2000, 2005 
[2000]). This temporal theory originates in a theory of language. Agamben makes the 
onto-anthropological claim that the defining feature of humans is language use 
(Agamben, 1999a: 51). Reading Benjamin, he argues that language and history are 
intertwined, yet marked by a fracture within language itself - between the meaning that 
language articulates and ‘the “pure life of feeling”’ which has no supplementary 
meaning (Agamben, 1999a: 51). This fracture seeks to resolve itself in the ‘historical 
becoming of all languages’ (Agamben, 1999a: 54).  
 
Through the concept of infancy, Agamben draws a connection between ‘play’ and 
‘ritual’ of ‘both correspondence and opposition’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 77). Play 
destroys calendar time, transforming diachrony to synchrony, whereas ritual fixes and 
structures it, transforming synchrony into diachrony (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 77-8; 83). 
Life oscillates between these two temporal poles. He argues that play replaces closed 
structures with events (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 79-80). Ritual and sacrifice conversely 
transform events (such as birth and death) into structures (Ibid: 82). Nonetheless the 
transformation is never complete and both ritual and play produce a ‘stumbling block’ 
or ‘residue’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 86). Examples are children (who are not fully 
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adults) and ghosts – the residual image of the dead – neither of whom are perceived in 
society to be fully alive or fully dead. The contemporary age is thus marked by the 
destruction or loss of experience, in which the banality of everyday life cannot be 
experienced; an unhealthy link caused by the split between the subject of experience 
and of knowledge that it entails. Children and Ghosts are ‘the bearers of disorder and 
subversion’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 95). Thus ‘Playland and the land of ghosts set out 
a utopian typology of historyland, which has no site except in a signifying difference 
between diachrony and synchrony’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 93). 
 
Difference and critique 
Whilst Agamben sees in language and humanity a fracture that seeks to be resolved, the 
movement from this world into the messianic world should not be viewed in traditional 
terms of historical progress. He criticises progressivism for separating ideals from 
experience (Agamben, 1999a: 56). Messianic redemption must be able to redeem all of 
the past and history, not just the end of history (Agamben, 1999c: 152). Western theories 
of time, whether linear or circular, invariably focus on the instant, or precise moment as 
the dominating feature, and thus the passage of time is seen as a succession of points 
(Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 110). When the present is thus divided into an infinite and 
continuous series of quantifiable homogeneous instants, time is felt to be unreal and 
experience itself becomes ‘waiting and deferral’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 111). This 
prevents human existence from ‘taking possession of itself as something full and 
singular’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 111). 
 
Agamben argues that redemption resides in destruction and rupture; ‘what is at issue is 
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an interruption of tradition in which the past is fulfilled and thereby brought to its end 
once and for all’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 153). The historical dialectic cannot be 
fulfilled by the state; rather we should think of ‘the end of the state and the end of 
history at one and the same time’ (Agamben, 2000: 111) in order to mobilise one 
against the other. Thus the ‘coming community’ (Agamben, 1993 [1990]) will not arise 
from a struggle between states but from a struggle between the state and humanity itself. 
 
Agamben’s utopianism 
Whilst Agamben is critical of Western conceptions of time, including the linear, the 
circular, and the teleological, he argues that ‘the elements for a different conception of 
time lie scattered among the folds and shadows of the Western cultural tradition’ 
(Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 110). One source is Gnosticism, which negates the Christian 
impulse towards linear time and redemption, secularised as progress in post-
enlightenment societies (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 106). The utopia – Redemption – has 
‘already taken place’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 110) so resides not in some distant or 
impossible future; rather it is a spiritual experience that can be seized in the present 
through an alteration in perception: ‘The time of Gnosticism, therefore, is an incoherent 
and unhomogeneous time, whose truth is in the moment of abrupt interruption, when 
man, in a sudden act of consciousness, takes possession of his own condition of being 
resurrected’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 111). Such a conception of time is revolutionary, 
since it ‘refuses the past, whilst valuing in it, through an exemplary sense of the present, 
precisely what was condemned as negative ... and expecting nothing from the future’ 
(Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 111).  
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Agamben links (utopian) images of the revolutionary subject taken from Benjamin, 
Kafka, Heidegger and the Stoics to the Marxist idea of praxis (which is irreducible to a 
project or goal) and argues that there is an immediate and available experience, essential 
to humans, from which one can draw the foundations of such a concept of time: 
pleasure, which does not at all correspond to quantified time (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 
114). Contrary to Hegel, ‘it is only at the source and site of happiness that history can 
have a meaning for man [sic]’ (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 115). Thus accessing utopian 
time through the condition of happiness involves constructing one’s own freedom and 
autonomy in the present (Agamben, 2007 [1978]: 115). 
 
Central to Agamben’s view of messianic time – and the means of resistance by which it 
is simultaneously composed – is the idea of the ‘inoperative’ (Agamben, 2005 [2000]: 
54-5; 111). This idea is counterposed to the mastery of history through the end of 
history (Prozorov, 2009: 527). Agamben’s utopia interrupts the process of history and 
ushers in the messianic moment, residing in the disruptive subjectivity of the ‘whatever 
singularity’ (Agamben, 1993 [1990]: 1). Bringing together the threads in Agamben’s 
thought, the ‘Whatever singularity’ is a utopian being that plays, that can exist in 
community without presupposing identity or commonality, that uses language without 
meaning and which is a means without end. Such a being is the principle enemy of the 
state: ‘Wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there 
will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear’ (Agamben, 1993 
[1990]: 86). 
 
Conclusion 
  
23 
In the above article, we have attempted to retrospectively construct a body of temporal 
utopianism. By temporal utopianism, we have meant theories and practices that signal 
to something beyond the ordinary experience of time under capitalism. Just as utopian 
geography signals to other spaces, so temporal utopianism signals to other possible 
ways of experiencing time. Temporal utopianism is both critical and creative. By 
creating estranged ontological viewpoints from which the 'obvious' comes to seem 
problematic and contestable, these theories highlight oppressive aspects of mainstream 
understandings of time, whilst also signalling to possibilities for resistance at both 
psychological and social levels. They suggest ways in which relations could be 
rearranged to produce different experiences of time, constructing different lifeworlds.  
 
In classifying the theorists together as temporal utopians, we emphasise the similarity in 
the critical function of their theories of time. They have in common a tendency to point 
to modes of time which actualise hopes and desires, in distinction to dominant 
conceptions. For Benjamin, this takes the form of irruptions of messianic time which 
connect moments of different time-series together, rupturing the continuum of 
homogeneous empty time and creating a different experience of non-serial immediacy. 
Deleuze replaces consecutive time with continuous time which is constantly 'folded' and 
reconnected to form different temporal zones. His thesis of the ontological 
distinctiveness of past, present and future breaks with the dominant conception and 
points towards a novel theory of social change. He also emphasises the need to 
transcend the 'sensory-motor' present in experiences open to multiple durations and the 
holistic field of time. Nietzsche uses the idea of eternal return, and the resultant fusion 
of past, present and future, to critique theories of deferral, instead constructing an 
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experience of existence/becoming as abundant. Agamben points towards an experience 
of immediacy and fullness, in which play and diachrony break down the separations 
created in linear time. Each theory, in a different way, escapes and transcends dominant 
conceptions of time and points towards a different experience of time.  
 
Due to the constraints of space and format, we have limited our essay to seminal and 
fairly contemporary philosophical thought. However, our approach could be expanded 
to include activist theories (Bonanno, 1988; Robinson and Tormey, 2009; Zerzan, n.d.), 
indigenous conceptions (Whorf, 1956: 63; Anderson, 1991: 23-5; Munn, 1992; Meucke, 
2004; Telbun, 1998; Fausto and Heckenberger, 2007; Nandy, 2001; Rigby, 1995), 
practices in alternative communities (Stephenson, 2009), cultural practices such as 
retrofuturism and steampunk (Onions, 2008; Bell, 2009) and literature (Bakhtin, 1984 
[1929]; Moylan, 1986; Sargisson, 2006; Bell, 2009). The field of temporal utopianism is 
much broader than this article has expressed.  
 
There are certain similarities in the critiques. Firstly, they are all opposed to alienated 
time, and the objectivist ontology it entails. This is due to our criteria of selection. 
Secondly, they all tend towards a view of temporal rhizomatics, in which moments in 
time can be connected in ways irreducible to a sequential progression, much as points 
are connected in the Deleuzian theory of the rhizome. How such moments of time are 
conceived and how they connect varies between the theories. Thirdly, all the theories 
tend to construct a view of time as expressive, rather than instrumental. They focus on 
the subjective experience of time and ways in which this subjective experience can 
express forces of becoming. Fourthly, all the theories contain some element of 
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polyvocity in their conception of time. They suggest that different constructions of time 
lead to different experiences, rather than relying on a single, transcendent model taken 
to encompass all experiences of time. 
 
Perhaps related to this final point, the theories we considered also exhibit many 
differences. These include the relative importance of individual and collective 
constructions of time, the extent to which teleology and deferral are embraced or 
rejected, the closed or open nature of temporal circularities, and the extent to which time 
is viewed as holistic or rather, as a radically open future where anything and everything 
can be created. There are substantial disagreements among the authors. Benjamin is 
largely critical of Nietzsche. He views eternal return as continuous with homogeneous 
empty time, intensifying the capitalist experience in an apocalyptic leap, but ultimately 
preserving it (Benjamin, 1999 [1930-5]: 116, 119). Benjamin's critique of 'mere' life 
would also put him at odds with Agamben, his influence on the latter notwithstanding. 
Deleuze is broadly sympathetic to Nietzsche, but on the basis of a particular reading in 
which eternal return is taken to repeat, not particular experiences, but difference as such 
(Deleuze, 2006 [1962]: 24). Agamben draws heavily on Nietzsche and Benjamin in 
constructing a view of recognition among whatever-singularities which constructs social 
relations on the basis of difference. We have not sought in this paper to assess these 
disputes and mutual borrowings, instead suggesting the various theories as alternatives 
to be drawn on in imagining other temporalities.  
 
A further word might be said about the use value of our approach, and any ethical or 
political imperatives that issue from it. Our primary argument is that a sufficient theory 
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of utopia should take into account time as well as space. In saying this, we do not mean 
to say that other theorists of utopia do not have a theory of time. Rather, we question the 
extent to which utopias drawing on teleological or progressive conceptions of time, or 
assuming an underlying experience of time as finitude and lack, can escape 
homogeneous empty time and construct different experiences. It is not simply a matter 
of positing different futures or pasts within a temporal sequence which remains the 
same. Rather, a sufficient approach to utopia must reconsider the nature of time itself, 
and fundamentally reconstruct the relationship between past, present and future. This is 
not just an exercise in abstract philosophy and has implications for social 
transformation, in particular, the need to move towards immanent or prefigurative 
approaches instead of approaches based on deferral. We would also propose temporal 
utopianism as a research tool. The approach has relevance for writing utopian histories 
of marginal groups such as social movements, indigenous groups, alternative 
communities, travelling and nomadic communities, counter-cultural movements and so 
on, particularly where these movements are themselves prefigurative or immanentist, or 
have alternative conceptions of time.  
 
Through an engagement with four seminal thinkers, we have shown the existence of a 
field of temporal utopianism which is so far under-theorised and in need of greater 
recognition within utopian studies. It has been suggested that alternative experiences of 
time are crucial in reconstructing utopian experiences of becoming, prefiguration and 
immediacy. By situating utopianism in relation to experiences of time, one can conceive 
how the dominant experience has constructed utopia as impossible through the 
establishment of temporal closure. This article has sought to rupture this experience of 
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closure, enhancing the power of utopianism to actualise other worlds.  
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